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LATIN LEAFLET

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Give Good Ideas
a Chance,
Come Whence
They May

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The internal purpose of this publication is to provide a Clearing House for secondary classical teachers in New York and vicinity or anywhere else; to afford an opportunity to younger classical scholars anywhere for the publication of their more modest endeavors along the line of original work, which might not otherwise see the light; to stimulate the teaching and quicken the student activity in the classical work in the high schools of Greater New York. The external purpose is to establish one or more College-entrance-scholarships for the most successful graduates from high schools in New York City, to be awarded on a competitive examination. The proceeds over and above expenses will be devoted to a scholarship fund. The labor involved is a labor of love.

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ARTHUR S SOMERS, Central Board of Education

The Ablative with Dignus

Juv. I 73: *aude aliquid brevis Gyaris et carcere dignum, | si vis esse aliquid.* In *Gyaris et carcere* we have of course the well known "Ablative with dignus"; but it is futile to attempt to force upon these words the construction of the Ablative of Specification, which seems to be the favorite category of the grammars. Such a relation is here, at all events, quite inconceivable. However, there is more or less disagreement among the grammarians, and so, a somewhat independent treatment may perhaps be pardoned.

Thus it appears that our school grammars are not only not definite as to the origin of the construction, but disagree in their categorization of it. Madvig and Bennett favor the Ablative of Specification, and perhaps also, Gildersleeve, who nevertheless feels the need of a "special category". Allen and Greenough seem at least independent in their causal classification, while Harkness comes out from behind the accommodating mask of "special construction" into a more specific rôle (1898). This construction well illustrates the futility of grammatical terminology; yet terminology is necessary in assisting tender minds.

Etymology sometimes comes to the rescue where other forces fail. According to Lewis and Short's Latin Dictionary, *dignus* is from Skr. *daç-as*; Gr. *δοκέω*, *δόξα*; Lat. *decet*, *decus*. Stolz (Lautlehre pp 29 90) also supports this view. But this derivation has been abandoned in favor of the later and more plausible etymology given in Kühner II 252 15, viz.: "*√ dic*, *zeigen*, Skr. *diç-a-mi*, *zeige*, Gr. *δείκ-νυ-μι*, also eigentlich *geezeigt*, daher *ausgezeichnet* und so *wuerdig*". Thus, you see, how very easy it is by a little logic to bring the constructions of *dignus* within the fold of the Ablative of Specification. But unfortunately this disposition does not fit all the cases; as for instance in the example given above. Might we not, therefore, by the use of a little more logic, no less palatable than the foregoing, arrive at the Ablative of Price (Value or Measurement) through *dic-nus*=*aestimatus*?* So, at least says O Keller (See review in Am. J. Ph. IX 251).

* This view of the Ablative with *dignus* as an Ablative of Price was supported in *Latin Notes* (Mch 19 1897) and we were not a little gratified to find afterwards that Professor Moyan (Lane's Latin Gr. [1898] § 1392) had adopted the same category.

This view would not only be sufficiently elastic to fit all the cases, but would fasten its origin to the Instrumental side of the Ablative. Again the rare and poetical Genitive with *dignus* could be called the Genitive of Value and regarded as an analogous construction with the Ablative usage. D H H

More About the Dignus Qui Clause

In No 7 of THE LEAFLET, I said:

The use of the future participle in Silver Latin is so analogous to the development of Purpose and Result Clauses as to attract the attention. The shading of voluntary (personal) purpose into involuntary personal result and finally into impersonal result is quite parallel with the transition of the personal and voluntary future participle of intention into personal and involuntary capability or characteristic and finally into impersonal destiny or fitness. This ought to help Bennett (Appendix 368, 5) in understanding *dignus qui* with the Subjunctive, which he incorrectly records as a Purpose Clause and supports his position by several examples (no references) which so clearly illustrate characteristic, even shading into result, that we need look no further. The use of *dignus* with the Infinitive, which he regards as supporting his classification, is also clearly characteristic and much nearer result than purpose. A particularly good example of characteristic with the Infinitive is the one from Verg. Ecl. 5, 54: *et puer ipse cantari dignus*. The etymology of *dignus* also (whichever view is adopted) as well as its use with the Ablative (whether regarded as Cause, Characteristic or Specification or Price), is in direct line with characteristic. But this is another story.

If I have emphasized anything in the passage quoted, I have emphasized the personal and voluntary character of Purpose as opposed to the impersonal and involuntary character of Result. Whatever criticism is contained in the above of Mr Bennett's views applies, as can be plainly seen, only to his treatment of *dignus qui* clauses, and not to the relative clause in general. Therefore, when he says in No 20 of THE LATIN LEAFLET that another view of the relative clause is that it is a clause of characteristic, and that the only published indorsement of this view with which he is familiar is found in No 7 of THE LEAFLET, I am bewildered, since I do not find this statement in the passage referred to. But, if he means that this is the only published indorsement of the *dignus qui* clause as a clause of characteristic with which he is familiar, then we must conclude that he is unfamiliar with Gildersleeve § 631 1; with Lane §§1818-1819; and with the whole range of recent German authorities, many of whom go so far as to call the construction "konsekutive". We have none of the "epoch-making works" of Professor Hale which inform us as to his views of the *dignus qui* clause, and must therefore content ourselves with such a knowledge of his views as is reflected by his distinguished pupil, until the full light of the sun itself shall break upon us in Mr Hale's Latin Grammar, which we are informed is soon to appear above the horizon. We are forced therefore to the conclusion that THE LEAFLET cannot lay claim to the distinction of containing the only published indorsement of this popular view.

Mr Bennett, however, does enjoy the distinction of being quite alone not only in his view

of the *dignus qui* clause as a Clause of Purpose, but also in his definition of the characteristic clause. If one is permitted to make his own definitions, he does indeed enjoy a supreme advantage in establishing his case. When he says that characteristic belongs to the categorical as opposed to the *contingent, the willed, the desired*, does he mean that in the sphere of the Ideal there is room neither for categorization nor characteristic? If so, why does he adopt the variety of categories: *the willed, the desired, the contingent*, etc.? Why not let *Ideal* suffice for all? Why does he insist on characteristic being confined to the realm of fact? Is it not begging the question to make one's own definition and then say "you see, *by my definition*, such a clause cannot be regarded as characteristic"? Why does he insist on such a narrow range for the term *Characteristic*, and yet allow the broadest interpretation to the term *Purpose*? It may be true as well as psychological that *Purpose* antedates *Result* somewhere along the line of development. It is true also that not all results can be called *purposeful*. *Man proposes, God disposes*. Not all results are intended. Shall we refuse to differentiate between results which were intended on the part of some rational power and those which to the finite mind seem wholly involuntary? To refuse to recognize such differentiations would indeed be "unworthy of the scholar".

It may be true that the *Result Clause* can be genealogically shown to be the natural offspring of original and paternal *Purpose*, but shall we continue to call all the children by the same name? If so, why call a characterizing *Ablative* by any other name than the *Instrumental*? The fact is, scientific pedagogy requires differentiation.*

To return now to the *qui* clause following *dignus*, let us take the example which has been made the center of the argument on this point: *libri sunt digni qui legantur*. Let us start on our career of development with the sentences *scribit libros ut legantur*, and *scribit libros qui legantur*. In the former we have pure *Purpose*, in the latter, mixed *Purpose*. The advantage which *ut* possesses over *qui* is that it, and it alone, can introduce absolutely pure *Purpose*. The connective force of *ut* is looser than that of the relative, but the purpose is purer. Incidentally, it will be noticed that it is impossible to get away from the personal character of the purpose here expressed. Now take the sentence: *scribit libros dignos qui legantur*; it is evident that the admission into the sentence of the adjective *dignus* has opened the door for characterization (the proper function of an adjective), and the clause *qui legantur* not only serves logically as an extension of the adjective idea in *dignos*, but also preserves grammatically its connection with *libros* through the relative *qui*, and is therefore an adjective clause itself. Especial attention is called to the parallelism of the adjective with the relative and the Subjunctive (G 438 R). *Purpose* is still alive and prominent in this sentence owing to the personality of the main verb, but it is now no longer the only notion therein contained and may be far from the strongest one. The point is that when you pass from *ut* to *qui* you make your first step from pure *Purpose* to mixed *Purpose* by changing from an adverbial to an adjectival clause. When

you introduce the adjective *dignus* you have gone still another step and have introduced at the same time a positive element of characteristic. Now take the sentence *libri scribuntur digni qui legantur*. Here the personal element has lost part of its emphasis, due to the impersonal character of the passive, and the idea of *Purpose*, while still present, is a shade lighter. Now if you drop the verb *scribo* altogether and take the sentence *libri sunt digni qui legantur*, it is evident that *Purpose* has completely faded out, since there is no element in the sentence capable of conceiving a purpose. The sentence may now mean (1) "the books are worthy to be read" (*Characteristic*); or (2) "the books are worthy so that they are read" (*Result or Tendency*). Finally, if you will now introduce *tam* and read *libri sunt tam digni qui legantur*, you have crowded out every idea except *Result*. The trend of the *dignus qui* clause sets so strongly in the direction of *Result* that in late Latin *dignus* is actually followed by *ut*. I am not willing to admit that origin is a sufficient justification for retention of the terminology of the original classification. *Since new differentiations exist, new terms must be employed*. Out of the dead corpse of *Purpose*, *Characteristic* *Tendency* *Result* have been born.

This disposes of the main point at issue, and it now remains to say a word or two by way of rejoinder.

In the use of the terms "adjective relation" and "adverbial relation", Mr Bennett seems to me to be confusing logical relations and formal relations. The relative clause is formally adjectival, because linked grammatically with the substantive through the relative. It is logically adverbial, because it is logically an extension or modification (or both) of the adjective. In the sentence *puer cantari dignus, cantari* is characteristic, because it is logically an extension of the adjective *dignus*. *Cantari* alone may be adverbial to *dignus*, but what of it? *Cantari-dignus* is adjectival to *puer*.

So far as the sentence, *dat mihi surculos quos seram*, is concerned, Mr Bennett cannot hold me responsible for regarding it as a Clause of *Result* or *Characteristic* (though I will say in passing that the presence of *quos* is the first step in that direction), unless he holds himself responsible for regarding it as a *dignus qui* clause, since my criticism applied only to his "examples of *dignus qui* clauses"; and, as I have before inquired (LEAFLET No 20 footnote), "how can he so regard it, since it contains no *dignus*?"

It remains to say in closing that in calling the *dignus qui* clause, *libri sunt digni qui legantur*, a *Purpose Clause*, Mr Bennett and all others must see that he is using the term "*Purpose Clause*" in a sense which I have already repudiated and which I find is repudiated by all the most recent authorities on historical Latin syntax, except the distinguished author of Bennett's Latin Grammar.

DAVID H HOLMES

The New Leaflet Patrons

The Editorial Committee have great pleasure in announcing as LEAFLET PATRONS (5 yrs): Mr G D Munson of the Boys' High School, Brooklyn; Mr R L Massonneau of Brooklyn; Priu Chas S Haskell of P S No 2, Brooklyn; Dr E B Lease of the City College, New York; Dr J L Tildsley, Mr O C Skeele and Mrs A A Falk of the Peter Cooper High School, New York; Mr J J Sheppard, Dr D C McLaren and Mr F B Kelley of the DeWitt Clinton High School, New York; Miss Katherine A Spier of the Wadleigh High School, New York; Mr G H Hooper of the Columbia Grammar School, New York. A subscription of \$5 from Supt C W Lyon, Brooklyn, is also herewith thankfully acknowledged. It is pleasant also to note the addition of Dr Lease of the City College to our list of contributors.

*We are glad to see that Mr Bennett favors expansion in grammatical terminology. His "Shorter Grammar" had almost given rise to the conviction that he stood for retrenchment and condensation; but a closer inspection reveals that one of the most striking features of his grammar is *new* categories and *new* terminology. It is of course difficult to be brief and expansive at the same time.